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Abstract: 
The Central African Republic is an extremely impoverished country that has seen little development since its independence from France in 
1960. It is ranked 180 out of 186 countries on the U.N. Human Development Index (report 2016) and is in the Fund for Peace’s top 
10 failed states, next to Haiti and Afghanistan. The latest surge of violence in the country began when the Séléka rebels captured power 
in March 2013. They were responsible for mass killings, sexual violence, and looting. This paper critically analyses the factors that led to 
the outbreak of that conflict one of which the role that played by the foreign actors in this conflict. The research found that there are four 
main elements that caused   the conflict in the CAR including exclusion, repression, and competition over resources and foreign 
involvement. One of the important reasons behind that conflict is an economic factor which is the struggle for power and resources among 
political elites. The paper also found the repression combined with exclusion policies adopted by the Bozize and the precedent regimes also 
contributed to the outbreak of violence in CAR finally, the empirical evidence showed that there was a deep economic crisis behind the 
conflict, with the withdrawal of foreign investors the   Commercial crops such as cotton, coffee, also have deteriorated as well as the 
exploitation of forest income has declined. 
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1. Introduction 
Ethnic conflict can be defined as any episode of sustained violent conflict in which national ethnic and religious or 
other communal minorities challenge government or other ethnic groups to seek major change in status (Bates 
2003). An ethnic conflict between two contending ethnic groups, while the source of the conflict may be political, 
social or economic. The individuals in the conflict must expressly fight for their ethnic group’s position within 
society. This final criterion differentiates ethnic conflict from other form of struggle.  In Central African Republic 
(CAR), even though the Sango (local language) is the national language spoken by the majority of Central Africans, 
CAR still one of the deep diverse countries both ethnically and culturally. It hosts a diverse range of ethnic groups. 
According to 2003 census, CAR has population of about 4.3 million from which the Christian constitute 80 % of the 
total population. The Muslim constitutes only 15 % of the population (Agger 2014). The latest surge of violence in 
the country began when the Séléka rebels (mostly Muslims) captured power in March 2013 and committed atrocities 
against civilians. As a reaction to that violence self-defences groups named Anti-balaka emerged. This latter was 
responsible for mass killings, sexual violence, and looting too. (Anderson, MB, Brown 2013) 
This paper examines the economic aspect based on theory of competition over resources as cause of conflict to find 
out how competition over natural resources of CAR by both internal and eternal actors led to the outbreak of 
sectarian violence. Furthermore, the paper reviews the foreign interference into the conflict in CAR. 
 
2. Literature review 
The human experience with the conflict dates back to the emergence of the first human race (Robyn short 2000).  
To understand the phenomenon of ethnic conflict   many scholars started before anything else by figuring out its 
causes.  Number of researchers including economist sheds light that ethnic conflict are mostly economic interest 
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driven conflict. The promoters of this approach tend to associate the competition over resources as the main factor 
or direct element that causes violence. Struggle engaged   by communal groups for such basic needs as security, 
recognition, acceptance, fair access to political institutions and economic participation. 
Another group of researchers demonstrate that conflict is driven by a factor that called “Elite manipulation “. These 
scholars argue that ethnic conflict is merely elite driven clashes. Because leaders incite ethno-nationalism to secure 
their own hold on power (nationalism studies project 2008). According to these scholars the mass can be easily 
manipulated by political leaders seeking to mobilize social group ethnically distinct group especially when a society 
going through socio-economic difficulties (Gellener 1983).   
The structuralisms (international system) propose that there are structural factors as element that causes violence.  
Willet Susan and Ayoob Mhammed claims that there are long term factors (structural) elements which are 
interconnected political social and economic factors that causes conflict in many parts of the world. For instance, the 
population pressure, distributional injustice and the depletion of natural resources are encouraging element for 
violence. 
Another group mainly of international relation analyst   argues that the territory s intrinsic value attached by a group 
of people to a specific land   is one of the main driven factors of conflict.  According to them the parties of the 
conflict attach some identity-based to territory; therefore, they are willing to   use force to secure a valuable territory.  
According to theories of extreme ethnic violence or the post-soviet ethnic violent conflict is the essentialism 
approach that called sometime ancient ethnic hatred or primordial antagonism as the trigger of ethnic violence.  
Scholar’s fulling under this category argues that the presence of ancient mutual hostility mixed with differences such 
as religion and culture can lead to a conflict.  
Finally, another group of researchers suggest the rational choice approach to explain ethnic violence. According this 
perspective   ethnic violence can be merely explained by the   outcome of rational choice or decision that made by 
individual to accomplish potential target.  Because human beings are strategic calculators and goal-oriented creators, 
they choose whatever means sometime violence to achieve a given goal. Moreover, this group of scholar 
incorporated some realist ideas from international relation theories to draw conclusion of the rationality of ethnic 
violence. They believe that ethnic violence accrues when there is not going to be a change in the statues-quo because 
“when a leader sees the costs of war are less than the expected costs of further decline “ (Christoph 2014). 
 
3. Economic Causes Of The Conflict 
Most of the data that issued by formal institution shows not good stand of socio-economic development in CAR the 
poverty index report of 2018 indicates that 80 % of the CAR’s population earn less than 2 $ a day. These facts might 
go worth in the rural era where there is no public transportation facility. Hence, the human development index of 
2103 indicated that CAR ranked 185 out of 187countries. These figures show the bad performance of economy in 
CAR.  This economic and political turmoil and constant state of insecurity that ravaged the CAR did not start up 
with the arrival of the Rebels to Bangui and overthrown of the regime by SELEKA militias, but it began before the 
SELEKA alliance come to power in March 2013.  According to many observers this crisis is the direct outcome of 
political instability which lasted more than 10 years which is caused by previous social and economic crisis (UNDP 
2014) Is the combination of the economic “degeneration “that installed in the country since 1980 s , add to that the 
failed democratization process in the late 1990s  a process  from which  a there three military personnel  have ruled  
the  country  as well as   the structural mismanagement  that  lasted for decades . Therefore, it is important to 
examine the economic aspect of this crisis. 
 
3.1 Deep economic crisis 
After the Golden age of CAR s economy which is associated with the collective memory of the ex-formal president 
BOKASSA, the CAR s economy has stagnated   gradually. From the end of late 1990s to the present days, the 
number of companies operating in the country has decreased from 521 to 52, (Jean Christoph victor 2018) for 
instance on the wake of the crisis in 2015 Only one metal establishment survived, and this company was looted 
during the invasion of SELEKA these criminal attitudes has   forced its owners to   stop all their activities which 
were limited to exploitation.  Yet, the leaders of Central Africa have always been proud of mineral wealth of the 
country, a real metal sector as it never existed as a specific industrial   field of metals; including gold and diamonds.  
For example, they are shaded in a traditional way which is very modest compared to other producers in the African 
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continent and most of their activity remains outside the control of the state. Another element that influenced the 
CAR s economy is that the     Commercial crops such as cotton coffee, also have deteriorated and have not yet 
reached the level of old production and only agriculture (Keenan , M  and A. giffen 2014 ). However, Basic cereals 
and vegetables have enabled the majority of the rural population to survive and other extractive activities as 
companies (human security report 2013) the exploitation of forests no longer exceeds the fingers of one hand and 
the cost of financing which made it very difficult in term of competitiveness in the international market especially 
with withdrawal of investors. The following cruft showing the economic output of CAR since 1980 to 2012. 
Figure: 3.1.  Economic Output of CAR since 1980 to 2012. 
 
 
     Source: Aljazeera report 2013 
 
In general, the Chart shows that there has been a rise in GDP in CAR in 1980s till 2000. so, we can see from the 
chart that the highest level of It is GDP have been achieved in 1980. However, the chart indicates that just the 
following years the country witnessed a dramatic decrease in GDP till 2015. furthermore, it is clear evident that the 
chart shows the similar pattern of decrease till 2012. (Aljazeera report March ,2013). 
 
3.2 Competition over Resources 
It has been well known that the cost of an armed conflict is very high, because it requires enormous financial support 
to pay the acquisition of military equipment including weapons ammunitions military uniform, food, medicine, 
vehicles telecommunication equipment and wealth. The natural resources such as forest hydrocarbons and mines are 
appreciated by many powers and businessman because the control of these sources is essential and core financial 
base of an armed resistance. (Paulin Jaban kabka 2015) This money must come from somewhere mostly from of the 
country s resources, the overall natural resources including forest hydrocarbons and mining are source of attraction 
of business man as well as the military and political actors that involved in an armed conflict. Because such sources 
are essential for an armed resistance. in fact, the armed group that lose the ability of acquiring and controlling natural 
resources could naturally lose the war because the group will not be able to preserve and continue in the war effort. 
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3.3 Withdrawal of Foreign Investors from CAR   
In addition the  Investments from the International companies which mostly French  capital dominates the economy 
but the Central African Republic has tried since independence to attract capital and development monies from other 
countries, including Libya, Taiwan, China, Germany, and Japan.  However, due  to the  drop of  timber  prices   that  
sector  did  not  witnessed  a  big improvement. 
 
 
France 24,70% 
U.S 9,80% 
Netherlands 8,70% 
China 6,90% 
Cameroon 6,30% 
Other 43,60% 
Figure: 3.2 
Sources: TOMOLYA János and Jean-François: AARMS and Grenoble ESG, 2014. 
 
The Seleka militias financed their actions by exporting diamond and exporting timber to the neighboring countries 
meanwhile Anti-balaka, mostly founded its troops through the control the hydrocarbons and timbers (UNHCR 
2018). The national army is financed by the state budget that remains. Therefore, this competition over country’s 
resources led to a deep economic crisis. This deep economic crisis was managed for few years by a huge dependence 
on foreign aid (UNDP 2014). For instance, the salary of the civil servant paid by foreign aid. despite of that 
difficulties the regime of Bozize was able to pay the civil servant an army from the that collected from various 
sources including world bank, African development bank, European union etc. these donners granted in somehow 
the civil and military servant s salary at least at least in the capital city Bangui. Therefore, one of main cause led to 
that crisis is corruption combined with mismanagement. For instance, some companies gave financial support to the 
rebels in the middle of the civil war so that they can pursue wood cutting and exporting it. This situation refers to 
what is called the Resource Curse or the Dutch disease which denote the paradoxicality or the difficulty for ensuring 
social and economic development when there is an abundant natural resource (Paul collier). In the contrary, the 
presence of resources attracts suffering from everywhere. Many studies reveled that countries with huge natural 
resources are often fall prey to civil war, because their potential wealth is main factor that keep getting them into 
trouble. In our case even the neighboring countries are benefiting from CAR resources because wood, oil and 
diamonds are exported through Cameroon, Chad, the DRC that one of the reasons why especially these three 
countries heavily involved in this conflict. Like the other African countries, in the region the contribution and 
participation of the exploitation of the natural resources helped to the sustainability and longevity of armed conflict. 
For instance, the NGOS Global witness accused operators mostly (French Lebanese Chinese) foresters of complicity 
in crime in the conflict in CAR, because they thought that the companies made a profit in the middle of the civil war 
by funding rebels. (Aljazeera report 2013) 
 
4. Political Causes Of The Conflict   
4.1 Weak state 
Conflict can emerge when a government fails to address the condition that might create tension .in fact; there are 
symptoms that can indicate government weaknesses including the emergence of criminal organization, war lord, 
corruption, epidemic (Agger 2014). One of the main elements   that caused    the outbreak of the conflict in CAR is 
that a weak state that deliberately engaged in applying policy of planed exclusion.  In order to stay in power as long 
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as possible the formal president Bozize developed a tactic which was the weakening of the governmental institutions 
particularly the national army (FACCA). He reduced the national army to presidential guard. (   jean Christoph victor 
2018   ) the reason behind this tactic  is  to avoid   of  being overthrown by  either  by   the  national army  or the 
police  body , in other word He implemented this  Machiavellian tactic  which  consist of weakening of the army out 
of  fear  of potential coup (  Paulin Iban kabka 2015) in such  condition  some citizens (politicians and military 
leaders)   developed the believe  that  violence is the only way to conquer  power in country as the  Global security  
report of 2006 outlined  that  since  the  independence  CAR has experienced  five  subsequent  military coups which  
some  succeeded  on overthrow of the central government. As result of this political turmoil and generalized 
insecurity result into two disastrous consequences which are the central government led by Bozize was not able to 
maintain peace and security and courting urgencies. Second: the police were not able to control the integrity of the 
territory (Report 1, September 2016). 
 
4.2 Failed Democratization Process 
One of the issues that considered being common causes of conflict in African politics is the lack of democratization.  
“the western style of democracy in great difficulties to take root in African state “(CLE 2018) many African tend to 
choose a representatives (parliament, president) not based on what they can do for  the  society  or  their  ability to 
perform rather they choose  a leader because He or She merely  belong  to their  ethnic groups. The attitude that 
generally do not allow to some especially the minority one to come to power through election. The lack of 
democratization considered to be one of the major elements of the conflict in CAR (Binoua J. 2005). many observers 
of this conflict argued that such conflict can be avoided or at least minimized by holding a free and fair election that 
encourage the active participation of ordinary citizen in economic and social life , because any attempt to  exclude  
any  ordinary citizen   from  these  right  due to its ethnic , religious  belonging will automatically create  a sentiment 
of resentment and  hostility against the central government (UNDP 2014). In the era of the formal president 
BOZIZE the basic citizen need is denied especially those who are living in rural area. As retaliatory action to these 
unjust policies the marginalized citizens has no option than take up an arm in order to make his voice heard and 
claims its rights. This act of taking guns tend to   provokes a protracted social conflict in most of the cases 
(Nehemiah 2004   ).   
Furthermore, the long-lasting unresolved conflict have been used by the entrepreneurs of violence to manipulate 
some population, that what lead to what is called by an observer “social disorganization especially in the absence of 
clear social norms to settle differences. Because the traditional systems of dispute settlement has been neglected by 
the government for many years (Kolck P. 1971). finally , The internal geopolitical crisis of Central Africa is the cause 
of the current violence, Historically, the Muslim population has had a minority Northern governorates .The arrival of 
"silica" armed Muslim militias, to power shock broke the rules of a political game was controlled She was in control 
A political class representing ethnic groups in the west and center of the country and orbiting the military 
government The reaction against Silica also falls within the scope The clash of cultures between coastal populations 
and forest dwellers (Global center for the responsibility to protect 2014). 
 
4.3 Lack of Rule of Law 
One of the commonly experienced problems in African politic is the lack of accountability particularly for political 
and military elites. This goes for the CAR s political situation this impunity. The situation of lack of trial and 
persecution of the responsible for violence especially those who carried out massive human wright abuses lead to 
cycle of violence. Because activist and victim from both sides will be motivated by a deep desire for revanche which 
will definitely lead to a new cycle of tension. Both The previous and the Bozize regime are undermined the legal 
system of CAR by creating a system that make impossible accountable of their act which encourage them to commit 
further crime.   
Another situation which is created by the lack of rule of law which is that  an increase level of risk of outbreaking of 
a conflict between an armed and unarmed groups especially the one that target  minority due to the competition over 
resources and to  confiscate goods land and some rare  resources . Even though the Bangui forum provided an 
opportunity for the creation of special criminal court and a trust justice reparation and reconciliation commission 
because of the current situation which undermines the rule of law the procedure of peace building will be 
challenging.   
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5. The Involvement of Foreign Actors 
The regional and international attention to the crisis in Central Africa, particularly those of Chad and France have 
been closely noticed by observers. due to the fact that both of them has military forces in the country the French 
military presence did not stop since the independence even    If the size varies from one period to another, 
meanwhile, Chad's military presence dates back to the late 1990s. in this section we will analyses the nature of these 
relations and the motives of these foreign actors to interfere in this conflict:  
Zeleza argued that any attempt to cope with a conflict in Africa has to take into consideration the root causes of the 
ongoing problems which are according to her mostly linked to the ancient colonial era.  In their book “the root of 
African conflict:  the cause and the cost “Zeleza and Nehema conceded that before anything else the cause of these 
conflict has its origin in the colonial era when the European imperialist scrambled for Africa, they shared among 
them the continent without taking into consideration the ethnical make-up of the local population. therefore the  
result of that policies, particularly after the decolonization , African states are bunch of “polyglot “ a  mixture of 
cultural and linguistic groups which create a situation described by many as “incohesive nations “, in other word the 
inhabitants are not able to create a society based on harmony and solidarity based on national loyalty rather they tend 
to   develop solidarity based on micro-ethnic customs and values that tend to be loyal to an ethnic group. (Ayoob 
Mahammad 2001).  
Secondly, the direct or indirect   interference of regional actors while pursuing their political, economic, influence, 
security interest has contributed to    the conflict in CAR. According to ( GANSON B )  the  neighboring   countries  
generally tend to  interfere in  other armed conflict  either  due  to the one of  following  reasons  fist :   to protect 
themselves against  the  risk  that  might  be  caused  by  a neighboring conflict  second : to support  some  actors 
that  they  considered worthy  of their  support  , therefore It is worth to note that   the regional and international 
power  game is one of the factors that  some conflict  last longer  than others .  
To be more precise for instance Chad supported Muslim dominated rebels and other southern neighbors being close 
to the Christian militias Anti-balaka. (Boche 2013). Hence, the religious character is served as identity reference to 
the both movement which helped in a way or another to gain financial support from the neighboring   countries as 
well from the international level. these political  consideration  with  religious connotation  of the  countries of  the  
sub-region  have effected  even  on some organization for instance the( MISCA ) the international mission to 
maintain peace in CAR during the operation of this mission  Chadian soldiers were accused  of providing  
intelligence  and  weapon to  Muslim seleka fighters the reason why Chadian government was  forced to withdraw its 
troops even though there is no guarantee  that Chad dose not continue to provide logistic and intelligence support to 
the northern army branch . 
Even though there is a strong French and Chadian military presence in CAR The objectives differ: French and 
Chadian regarding their military presence in Central Africa; For Chad, it means defending security interests and 
economic priority.  the formal president of Chad Idriss Deby does not want the Central African Republic to turn 
into a base for armed opposition and he is keen to use grazing land Central Africa, the livestock of its citizens during 
the summer.  As for France, the act of sending troop was   as a response to pressure from the humanitarian lobby in  
the country most of NGOS in CAR are French In the year  were French organizations And appeals to some 
countries in the region.  
  
5.1 The Rationale Behind Chadian Intervention  
It has been noticed that before and during the crisis in CAR There was a very close relationship between the Chadian 
central government and the SELEKA militias members particularly with their leaders, from historical background, 
the root of this relation date back to 1990 s and described by observers as especial relation which made almost 
necessary for Chadian government to fallow up and pay close attention to the recent development of the situation in 
CAR.  to indicate how fare this relation gone for instance, Due to the pressure from the Chadian president in January 
2014, the interim president of CAR Michel Djotadia has resigned during the summit of economic community of 
central African states which held in the Chadian Capita Ndjamena. Hence, under the (MISCA) united nation mission 
to bring peace in CAR, Chad has deployed 5.500 in CAR in order maintain peace there.  
The direct  answer to  the question why the Chadians care about this conflict is that according to the human right 
activist report , the current Chadian regime has experience of Robel attack which used  the CAR s soil as camps for 
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preparation and training of their troops  this  is exactly the case of the prominent Chadian opposition leader Baba 
Lady  who used the border line of CAR as save heaven to protect himself  from potential Chadian counter Attack . 
therefore, there are two main interest for Chadian government to interfere into that conflict. firstly , security interest  
which consist of break the common habit of Chadian rebels and armed opposition to gather and train in CAR soil , 
to do so , the formal Chadian president Idriss Deby supported directly or indirectly some SELEKA leaders by 
thinking that bringing an ally to power can help to secure Chadian border and not allows further development of 
Chadian rebel by cutting them the road that would prevent to Chadian armed opposition to use CAR soil as save 
heaven to prosper .   
Secondly, there are enormous economic interests that ties strongly Chadian government with CAR s authority, many 
interviews reveled that the main reason of the Chadian government s support to SELEKA is to create a favorable 
environment to the Chadian businessman mostly (Gold and Dimond traders) to keep their advantageous position so 
that can continue making profit even if the regime Change in CAR. Moreover, the Chadian government believed that 
by supporting SELEKA they can they can mage to contain the conflict and to prevent it from affecting the Chadian 
oil field in the Sothern borderline of Chad with CAR, in fact the motive was interfering to prevent potential 
instability that might damage the operating Chadian oil field. on top of that there was another speculation about 
Chadian rational behind intervention which is to avoid sharing CAR s authority the (the cross-border oil reservoir) 
especially after the discovery of that reservoir by Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) recently. 
 
5.2 The Rationale Behind France Intervention  
There are many actors involved in political crisis in CAR. The anarchic structure of world politics stimulates many 
actors to influence political, economic and social dynamics of the other country (John Mearsheimer 2014). For 
example, France was a colonial power of many African and CAR until 1960, having taken particular interest in the 
region at the Berlin Conference of 1884. The French influence in CAR takes its root since from the colonial era 
where the European imperialist scrambled for African land from 1881 to the first world war.  As a consequence of 
that decision bunch of African countries become a French protected land from which the CAR part of it. after the 
wave of independence of 1960s, France still continue to play a critical political and economic with its ancient 
colonies.  this ties with its colonies illustrated with the presence of French military contingent in many places in some 
French speaking African countries. Hence, one of the most important French foreign policy in Africa is that France 
aims to bring a political leader in power who will be working with France very closely to serve and protect   French 
interests in place. According to some analyst of African governance and politic for France, it is not about special 
security and economic interests that motivated France to intervene in those countries. The French military presence 
in the region has two points (Libreville and N'Djamena), and the few French institutions that still exist in the country 
no longer have a significant business figure That the number of members of the French community is very limited, 
but the French intervention comes as a response to the pressure of the lobby because most of the international non-
governmental organizations in Central Africa in 2005 were French organizations), and anonymous appeals to some 
States in the region. Despite their relations with some field of operations, French forces do not work harmoniously 
in Bangui; 
However, unlike that period there have been a demographic and structure change in CAR which have affected 
clearly the French influence when the political crisis began in the CAR in 2013. because it has been realized that t in 
the beginning of the crisis Francois Holland government distant himself far away from the conflict. for instance, 
President Holland refused to respond to president Bozize call for assistance. the French military representative stated 
that they are here only to protect French national and airport.  however, the France position changed when they 
realized that there is an imminent to many civilian lives and there were grave human right abuses carried out by 
SELEKA members. this situation obliged France to address the united nation to initiate intervention in order to 
prevent further abuses and bring peace. Hence the French diplomatic representative stated in his interview accorded 
to BBC “We knew that there was some inter sectarian violence so we called for resolution the we deployed 900 
troops (Le monde 2014).  
 
5.3 The Rational Behind Sudanese And Cameroonian Involvement Into The Conflict 
Sudanese and Chadian influence to Bangui date back to more than two decades ago, the Nor- east of CAR regularly 
has been used by both Chadian and Sudanese mercenaries and warlord as training camps before and during the 
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Darfur conflict (Lombard 2014). this has influenced the instability of the region particularly within CAR. in 2016 
Campbell stated that because of that influence the military personnel of SELEKA mostly dominated by Chadian and 
Sudanese. they are consisting of 80 % of SELEKA in 2014 (FIDH 2014). Meanwhile the Cameroonian government 
had different consideration unlike the Chadians and Sudanese, according to some national observers the 
consideration that motivated the Cameroonian government to support the Bozize regime are primarily economic as 
well as security concerns. the economic survey Magazine reveled that export and transit of Goods from and to CAR 
has decreased since the beginning of the tension in 2013, the trade volume decrease estimated by 49 % in mid of 
2013 which was the real reason why the Cameroonian authority felt the necessity to support the Bozize regime to 
bring stability and to avoid more negative impact on Cameroonian economy. In addition to the economic, there was 
another concern which motivated   the formal president of Cameroon felt the necessity to act in support of the 
central governance is the presence of both SELEKA members and some (FACA) National army of republic of 
central Africa members in the Cameroonian soil which led to many incursions in refugee camps that established in 
the eastern borderline with Cameroon (Dunkhan 2016). so, the support was to prevent further incursion in the 
refugee camps sated up in Cameroon. Meanwhile the Sudanese authority s concern was looking for new allies which 
will add to the Sudan influence in the rejoin if they manage to find a new ally like SELEKA leaders as well as the 
Sudanese opposition can not use the borderline between the two countries as heaven to prepare and cause suffer to 
Sudanese people. 
 
5.3 Conclusion 
Chad and France share both military forces in Central Africa, and the French military presence has not ceased. The 
country has been independent since its independence, although its size varies from one period to the next. Chad's 
military presence dates back to the late 1990s. And to Chad A presence in the African Union (MICIVIH), and 
another military presence outside Forces, and there are some Chadian forces in north-eastern Central Africa in the 
province of Vagaka years ago based on An agreement with Bangui, and some of them without legal cover after the 
deportation of Chadian citizens France has been published To secure Bangui airport during the Seleka victory, and 
then decided to carry out a disarmament operation that began in early December is now composed of 2,000 soldiers. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This research found that there are four elements that caused the conflict in the CAR including exclusion, repression, 
and competition over resources and foreign involvement. One of the important reasons of the conflict is the struggle 
for power and resources among political elites. Both side the rebels and the central government used the 
fragmentation that already exist in the social and political level in the CAR   to acquire power and resources. 
 The research highlight that the repression combined with exclusion policies adopted by the Bozize and the 
precedent regimes also contributed to the outbreak of violence in CAR. Bozize appointed in his government civil 
and military mostly from his own ethnic groups and his relatives especially in some position that he considered to be   
strategic from political and economic point of view. This irresponsible attitude provokes sentiment of “grievance “or 
having the feeling of being deprived from his or her right. As result several armed groups appeared including 
SELEK, Anti-balaka, many leaders of this later s armed groups thought that the only option left on the table to get 
their rights which is active participation in political and economic and social life is to take arms particular the failure 
of the peace agreement which was the peaceful approach to secure their rights.   
The research found that the   main reason behind the failure of the peace agreement is the lack of mutual trust 
between political leaders. This materialized when Bozize did not did not keep his promises regarding to the peace 
agreement and he did not want to share the power with some leaders of these armed groups. Again, the Bozize 
attitude damages the trust between the main political leaders. Finally, regional and international actors interfered into 
this conflict basically to secure their geo-political interest especially the republic of Chad which has direct social and   
economic connection with the CAR nation in almost all levels. Moreover, president Bozize decision to shift allies 
from the conventional one which are Chad and France to new regional and international powers such as China and 
South Africa. To punish Bozize for his unwillingness to implement the peace agreement and turning to new allies the 
economic community of central African states (ECCAS) cut its financial support to the Bozize regime. Similarly, 
Chad and France stopped baking the regime even though they are the one who broth him to the power, due to these 
reasons they did not protected the regime from rebel attack.  
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The research highlights some challenges that will be faced by both the local authorities and international community. 
These challenges can be illustrated in the following point:  -the first one: international community has to make these 
partnership work better what we believe is important here is really about information and analysis. if we want a 
shared objectives which we are going to need to have a shared solutions we really need to have the same analysis of 
the problem that we face and we think the big problem that we have seen in why the united nation and African 
union and others sometime disagree is that they do not share the same analysis of the problem or they put different 
problem as in different level of priority. So is very important that they should try and share as much information and 
analysis as possible so that they can come up with the same diagnoses of the problem, the same priority of the issues 
and hence the give the researchers a chance of coming up with shared solution.  
Second, there is a big challenge for exit strategies because they tend to do not think hard enough about the entry 
strategies and we think what we need to do better going forward is to be very honest about themselves to know what 
are the situation where peace operation ca help and what are the situation where ca not. In a situation like Central 
African Republic the ongoing war none of the parties are really serious about peace. The most important things to 
know in such a conflict what peacekeepers can do? Of course they can help facilitate humanitarian assistance they 
can put a lid on very worst negative consequences of warfare but they cannot solve a war when the belligerent want 
to fight a war, therefore they should think very carefully about what are the circumstances where it’s just wrong 
choice of instrument to deploy a peace keeping mission.  -Third, is about the financial fund. The funding problem 
for African mission there can be no ownership a no leadership of the peace and security architecture in Africa unless 
there is more of slice of the funds come from the African continent. The point to start is there is with Oba Sanja 
report but also to persuade government and head of the state on the continent that these are problem that are worth 
investing in even if its investing in this is expensive but it’s going to be more expensive and more costly if we do 
invest in these peace mechanism. 
 
7. Recommendations 
As the Secretary-General of the United Nations pointed out in his latest report, there will be no quick solution to the 
Central African crisis; The roots of the crisis explain the impossibility of overcoming them in a short time; first of all, 
the security crisis must be contained so that it can be restored The establishment of state structures and the 
construction of an economy capable of providing employment opportunities. The biggest bet now in Central Africa 
is empowerment Economic cycle that allows most people to earn a living fairly. This requires refraining from ready-
made constructs and to use critical thinking to understand the causes of the failure of development assistance to the 
country.  If partnership of peace keeping is going to be really the way forward we cannot have solution just coming 
out of Africa alone, Africa in challenge which is very important the best thing could be done is a coming in hybrid 
international sense. So in that spirit we offer some recommendations of what we can do better. 
 
7.1 To The CAR Authorities 
A number of objectives have been identified as a critical in addressing causes of insecurity and violence: 
• Objective 1: protection of the civilian population through the fallowing steps:  
First: condemning publicly and systematically all the human right violation committed by SELEKA members. 
Second: establishing a national army force and engaging with regional and international force in a comprehensive 
join process to contain SELEKA troops as first step to disarm them. 
Third: strengthening the CAR security and defense force through extensive training that will allow them to know 
how to deal with unconventional human right violation such as collective rape.  
Fourth: restoring the authority of state particularly the defense and security forces justice and the basic service such 
as schools, Hospitals on the whole CAR s territory without seclusion of any region or community.  
Fifth: to facilitate and support the work of national and international activists in place including journalist NGOs and 
humanitarian workers throughout the country.  
• Objective 2 : fighting against impunity by talking the following phenomenon :  
• Fighting against impunity especially the perpetrators of serious humanitarian and human right 
violations.  
• To persecute SELEKA members who have been accused of   committing war crime and violation of 
human right.  
72 Habib Adam Ahmat 
 
72 
 
• Supporting the national committee of   inquiry in a way that will allows them to establish facts 
concerning with the responsible of crimes committed by SELEKA members and Civilians before and 
after the crisis.  Establishment of a hybrid tribunal composed from national and international 
persecutors to try the responsible of those crimes that established by the fact-finding mission of the 
united nation commission of human right.  
• Raising a fund with the support of the international community to compensate the victims of looting.  
• Legislate a specific law to fight against sexual violence and create a different mechanism that would 
facilitate women s access to justice.  
• To cooperate with the (ICC) with the accordance of the principle of complementarily as mentioned in 
Rome statue. 
 
7.2 Objective 3: Administration of Justice 
There is a need to take all necessary means to ensure that the aerostation and detention are conducted in accordance 
with CAR s criminal code procedures and the other provision of law including the international human right.   
-to release immediately anyone arrested or detained arbitrarily. 
To take all possible measures to stop the act of torture inhuman degrading treatment and punishment that carried 
out by the official in the detention center against any person accused of having committed crimes.  
- To close all without distinction the illegal detention center   
- To establish an action plan to strengthening the CAR s legal system with the support of the international 
community. 
- To abolish the death penalty to comply with resolution of commission on Human and people’s right. 
 
7.3 Objective 4 : Social and Economic Right 
• To pay regularly the civil servants  
• To take all necessary measures to fight against corruption. 
• Wrestling against illegal exploitation of all kind of natural resources including Diamond and Gold. 
• Monopolization by the central authority the right of exploitation of natural resources. 
In order to ratify the African charter of on democracy election , governance as the protocol of African charter on the 
African court of human and people s right (a charter that designed  to give right  to NGOs  to sue  in African  courts  
in case their right is violated). Furthermore to ratify the convention against torture and inhuman degrading treatment 
and punishment. Also to ratify the optional protocol on the right of Child and the involvement of Children in armed 
conflict. 
 
7.4 To The Un Security Council And African Union S Council For Peace And Security 
• To condemn all violation of international humanitarian law and human right law perpetrated in the 
country.  
In order to supporting the stuff of “MISCA’’ the international mission support for CAR must to ensure the 
protection of the population throughout the CAR territory.  Also to support the MISCA to implement a mandate 
that will enable the following major points:  
• guarantee the protection of human right activist and the journalist;  
• Establishing several Garrison especially in the province and the main cities of the countries; 
• Increase the surveillance in a wide range around the garrisons to prevent all act of violence against 
civilian; 
• Implementation of Libreville agreement containing and disarming SELEKA rebels; and   
• Granting the security and protection of national and international representative by providing them 
mains to leave the country. And ensuring the security and working condition of the humanitarian 
activist throughout the country. 
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